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REMEDIES AND THE GOVERNMENT’S
CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMFUL SPEECH 
Helen Norton* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When we see the terms “government” and “speech” in close 
proximity, we often think of the constitutional problems triggered by the 
government’s efforts to regulate others’ expression. In this brief essay, I 
focus instead on the constitutional issues raised by the government’s own 
speech. Although the Free Speech Clause prohibits the government from 
discriminating on the basis of viewpoint when regulating private parties’ 
speech, the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine permits the 
government to express its own viewpoint when it itself is speaking.1 In so 
holding, the Court recognizes that the government’s expressive choices 
are often quite valuable to the public and thus appropriately privileges the 
government’s ability to make its own decisions about what it will and 
won’t say.2 
As I have suggested elsewhere, however, the Court’s doctrine 
remains incomplete in at least two respects: 
First, the Court to date has failed to insist that the government 
affirmatively identify itself as the source of expression as a condition of 
claiming the government speech defense, even though meaningful 
political accountability requires such transparency. Second, the Court 
has yet to grapple with the ways in which the government’s speech 
sometimes affirmatively threatens specific constitutional values (apart 
* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. Thanks to Jessica Reed-Baum for excellent research assistance, and to Fred Bloom, Alan Chen, 
Melissa Hart, Sharon Jacobs, Margot Kaminski, Craig Konnoth, Scott Moss, Scott Skinner-
Thompson, and Tracy Thomas for thoughtful comments. 
1. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757-58 (2017). 
2. See id. at 1758 (characterizing government speech as “important—indeed, essential”). 
50 CONLAWNOW [9:49 
from whether and when the government’s religious speech sometimes 
violates the Establishment Clause).3 
Indeed, the government’s expressive choices should sometimes trigger 
our constitutional concern. Examples include the government’s threats or 
lies to silence the press or other governmental critics,4 the government’s 
speech that facilitates discrimination against protected class members,5 
and the government’s lies that deprive its targets of important liberties.6 
At the same time, constitutional challenges to the government’s 
speech raise vexing problems of their own. For example, although the 
potential harms of the government’s speech can at times be specific and 
individualized, at other times they seem more collective and diffuse.7 
Constitutional challenges to the government’s speech, moreover, require 
the judiciary to evaluate the politically accountable branches in ways that 
trigger separation of powers and related concerns.8 These complexities, in 
turn, invite courts to narrow the circumstances under which they will 
second-guess other governmental actors’ expressive choices.9 
Along these lines, Thomas Emerson and Mark Yudof were among 
the first to recognize the constitutional harms sometimes inflicted by the 
government’s speech, as well as the barriers to the judiciary’s ability to 
redress these injuries.10 Yudof, for example, expressed concern about 
3. Helen Norton, Government Speech and the Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST AM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3097156 
[hereinafter Norton, Manufacture of Doubt]. 
4. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Press Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998909 
[hereinafter Norton, Press Clause]. 
5. See Helen Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 194-98 (2012) [hereinafter Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech].  
6. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 89-107 
(2015) [hereinafter Norton, The Government’s Lies].  
7. See id. at 83 (“[G]overnment lies can inflict the harms of disloyalty in ways that severely
injure not only targeted individuals but also the broader public.”).  
8. Indeed, questions about remedies (as well as justiciability) are particularly acute with
respect to the government’s most devastating lies—e.g., its lies about its justifications for military 
force. As I’ve written elsewhere: “[O]ne can easily anticipate that constitutional litigation challenging 
such assertions as lies might be motivated by partisan rather than public interests, and that the 
judiciary might thus be reluctant to second-guess the choices of the President when exercising her 
Article II powers as commander-in-chief. . . . These [and other] complexities suggest that the 
government’s most catastrophic lies may be those especially resistant to redress.” Id. at 118-19. 
9. See id. at 83-89. To be sure, concerns about justiciability and remedies are often closely
intertwined. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 313 (1993) (observing the “variety of perplexities” 
that involve the relationship between rights to judicial review and rights to constitutional remedies).  
10. See Thomas Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1007
(1968) (“There is no effective legal remedy for much of [the government’s harassment of political 
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what he saw as the daunting challenges raised by constitutional litigation 
to constrain the government’s expression: “The difficulties in fashioning 
remedies are so substantial that they corroborate the wisdom of courts in 
general in avoiding the attempt to delimit the boundaries of 
unconstitutional government expression.”11 More specifically, Yudof 
feared injunctions because of separation of powers concerns and the 
potential for chilling valuable government speech12—even while 
acknowledging that “[i]njunctions may be appropriate in a few outrageous 
cases where a course of misconduct is likely to be repeated.”13 He noted 
the possibility of declaratory relief but wondered about its utility.14 And 
he saw at best a very limited role for damages.15 
But while I agree with Yudof’s menu of remedial possibilities, in this 
brief essay I seek to cast a more positive light on them: in certain 
circumstances, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or damages can and 
should be available to redress the government’s constitutionally harmful 
speech. I seek to show that although the search for constitutional remedies 
for the government’s harmful expression is challenging, it is far from 
futile. This search is also increasingly important at a time when the 
government’s expressive powers continue to grow—along with the 
government’s willingness to use these powers for disturbing purposes and 
with troubling consequences.16 In short, courts and lawyers need to 
dissenters through its own speech]. Statements of public officials or warnings of investigation, for 
instance, are not subject to judicial redress. Nor is it possible to obtain court review of most activities 
of legislative committees, apart from citations for contempt . . . .”). Indeed, these sorts of concerns 
have led me elsewhere to examine possible statutory, structural, political, and expressive responses 
to the government’s harmful speech. See Norton, Press Clause, supra note 4 (discussing engaged 
counterspeech and oversight by other government actors, the press, and the general public as 
nonconstitutional remedies for the government’s constitutionally harmful speech).  
10. See Norton, Manufacture of Doubt, supra note 3. 
11. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 205 (1983).  
12. Id. at 206 (“The most dangerous of the remedies is by far the injunction. It operates on
government much the way that prior restraints operate on private expression.”). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (“Declaratory relief might be available. Whether it would do more than produce ill-
feeling among the branches of government is questionable, though it might serve a symbolic 
function.”). 
15. Id. at 206-07 (“Damages, except in cases of individualized and unique injuries, also strike 
me as unworkable, even assuming that some constitutional or statutory basis can be found for such 
suits against government agencies or officials, and that here is no sovereign immunity bar to such 
remedies. . . . The damage remedy makes sense only when individuals have been discretely harmed, 
as for example, when government defames particular individuals or invades their privacy. Recoveries 
would be based on common-law tort doctrines and federal and state tort-claims acts (most of which 
would need to be amended to encompass such injuries.”). 
16. See Norton, Manufacture of Doubt, supra note 3. 
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identify remedies that permit us to name, and stop, the constitutional 
harms sometimes inflicted by the government’s destructive expressive 
choices. 
To be sure, questions about remedies are far from the only difficult 
problems raised by constitutional challenges to the government’s harmful 
speech. For example, as a threshold matter, sometimes we are not so sure 
that the speech at issue is actually the government’s, as can be true of 
expressive interactions between government and private speakers in 
contexts that create doubt about the source of the contested speech.17 Even 
if we focus on the many situations where the governmental source of the 
contested speech is clear, we might still wonder whether the dispute is 
justiciable, especially when we understand the government’s speech as a 
form of soft power distinct from its more traditional hard law actions.18 
Finally, even if the dispute is justiciable, we may then struggle with the 
merits of the constitutional claim; for example, when does the 
government’s speech cross the line from permissible persuasion, praise, 
or criticism to constitutionally impermissible coercion?19 
I acknowledge that these are interesting, hard, and important 
questions (and I have discussed them elsewhere). But in this essay, I seek 
only to show that there is some number of situations where the contested 
speech is clearly the government’s, where the dispute over its 
constitutionality is justiciable, and where the government’s speech does 
in fact violate a constitutional provision—and where courts can then 
appropriately identify and award constitutional remedies to stop, or call 
out, the government’s constitutionally harmful expression. In other words, 
I seek simply to reframe the conversation: the question should not be 
whether the government’s unconstitutional speech is ever remediable, but 
rather when and how. 
II. MAKE IT STOP: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
First, injunctive relief can be available to put a stop to the 
government’s constitutionally harmful speech. In fact, courts have long 
considered injunctive relief in cases challenging what we only now 
17. See Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
61 (2015) (proposing a test for determining whether contested speech is actually the government’s). 
18. Sometimes disputes are found nonjusticiable because political processes remain available
to redress concerns about the government’s choices. But such political processes may not be available, 
as a functional matter, when the government lies or otherwise speaks in ways that undermine 
meaningful political accountability. See generally Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 6.  
19. See id. at 89-197; Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194-98; Norton, 
Press Clause, supra note 4.  
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describe as “government speech.” Possibilities include court orders that 
require the government to stop, take down, or excise its threatening, 
inaccurate, hateful, or otherwise harmful speech alleged to violate specific 
constitutional protections. 
These decisions make clear, for example, that injunctive relief is 
available to stop the government’s speech that punishes or silences its 
targets’ expression in violation of the Free Speech Clause. Recall Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, where the petitioners—who were distributors of 
sexually explicit but non-obscene books and magazines—successfully 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against threatening speech by the 
Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth.20 There the 
Commission sent letters to the petitioners stating that it found some of 
their materials “objectionable for sale” to those under 18 and that it was 
sharing its views with local police departments.21 The letters often also 
mentioned the Commission’s “duty to recommend to the Attorney 
General prosecution of purveyors of obscenity.”22 The Supreme Court 
found that the Commission’s letters were sufficiently coercive to amount 
to unconstitutional censorship: 
The appellees are not law enforcement officers; they do not pretend that 
they are qualified to give or that they attempt to give distributors only 
fair legal advice. Their conduct as disclosed by this record shows plainly 
that they went far beyond advising the distributors of their legal rights 
and liabilities. Their operation was in fact a scheme of state censorship 
effectuated by extralegal sanctions; they acted as an agency not to advise 
but to suppress. 23 
Injunctive relief can similarly be available against federal 
government expression for claims brought directly under the First (or, 
with respect to equal protection or due process violations, Fifth) 
Amendments.24 Consider, for example, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee v. McGrath, where several organizations sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief under the First Amendment from then-Attorney 
General Tom Clark’s statement characterizing them as Communist front 
20. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
21. Id. at 59-63. 
22. Id.
23. Id. at 72; see also id. at 67 and n.8 (citing a number of cases in which “threats of prosecution 
or of license revocation, or listings or notifications of supposedly obscene or objectionable 
publications or motion pictures, on the part of chiefs of police or prosecutors, have been 
enjoined . . . .”).  
24. Some plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the federal government directly 
under the First or Fifth Amendments. With respect to federal agencies, see also 5 U.S.C. 702. 
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organizations.25 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal 
of the claim, stating that the effect of “the inclusion in the Attorney 
General’s list of a designation [as Communist] that is patently arbitrary or 
contrary to fact . . . is to cripple the functioning and damage the reputation 
of those organizations in their respective communities and in the 
nation.”26 As the Court made clear: 
These complaints do not raise the question of the personal liability of 
public officials for money damages caused by their ultra vires acts. They 
ask only for declaratory and injunctive relief striking the names of the 
designated organizations from the Attorney General’s published list and, 
as far as practicable, correcting the public records. The respondents are 
not immune from such a proceeding. . . .27 
Lower courts have similarly enjoined the government’s expressive 
choices that are sufficiently coercive of its targets’ speech to violate the 
First Amendment, or, with respect to state and local governments, the 
25. 341 U.S. 123 (1951); see also Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D.D.C. 1970) 
(“The conclusion is inescapable that the Report neither serves nor was intended to serve any purpose 
but the one explicitly indicated in the Report: to inhibit further speech on college campuses by those 
listed individuals and others whose political persuasion is not in accord with that of members of the 
Committee. If a report has no relationship to any existing or future proper legislative purpose and is 
issued solely for sake of exposure or intimidation, then it exceeds the legislative function of Congress; 
and where the publication will inhibit free speech and assembly, publication and distribution in 
official form at government expense may be enjoined.”); Note, Blacklisting Through the Official 
Publication of Congressional Reports, 81 YALE L.J. 188 (1971) (explaining the subsequent history 
and implications of the Hentoff decision).  
26. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 138-39 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also GEOFFREY STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 327 (2004) (“In December 1947, the Truman 
Administration published its first attorney general’s list of subversive organizations, which quickly 
became the official national ‘blacklist.’ Inclusion of an organization on the attorney general’s list was 
tantamount to public branding, without a hearing. Contributions to listed organizations quickly dried 
up, membership dwindled, and available meeting spaces became scarce.”). 
27. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 140-41 (“Finally, the standing of the petitioners to bring these suits
is clear. The touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right and the right of a bona 
fide charitable organization to carry on its work, free from defamatory statements of the kind 
discussed, is such a right. It is unrealistic to contend that because the respondents gave no orders 
directly to the petitioners to change their course of conduct, relief cannot be granted against what the 
respondents actually did. We long have granted relief to parties whose legal rights have been violated 
by unlawful public action, although such action made no direct demands upon them. The complaints 
here amply allege past and impending serious damages caused by the actions of which the petitioners 
complain.”); see also id. at 142 (Black, J., concurring) (“Without notice or hearing and under color of 
the President’s Executive Order No. 9835, the Attorney General found petitioners guilty of harboring 
treasonable opinions and designs, officially branded them as Communists, and promulgated his 
findings and conclusions for particular use as evidence against government employees suspected of 
disloyalty. In the present climate of public opinion it appears certain that the Attorney General’s much 
publicized findings, regardless of their truth or falsity, are the practical equivalents of confiscation 
and death sentences for any blacklisted organization not possessing extraordinary financial, political 
or religious prestige and influence.”). 
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Fourteenth Amendment. For example, a federal district court awarded 
injunctive relief against the federal Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography, which had sent letters to a number of magazine distributors 
threatening to list them in its final report as purveyors of pornography.28 
Drawing in great part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bantam 
Books, the lower court found that the Commission’s letters were 
sufficiently coercive to raise serious First Amendment issues, and thus 
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Commission from listing 
the distributors in its final report, and requiring the Commission “to send 
a letter to each addressee of the original letter advising them that the 
original letter has been withdrawn and that no reply is required.”29 In 
short, sometimes courts enjoin—and thus put a stop to—the government’s 
threatening speech that endangers key liberties. 
Relatedly, and more recently, the Seventh Circuit enjoined a sheriff’s 
threatening speech that sought to shut down certain sexually explicit 
advertisements: 
As a citizen or father, or in any other private capacity, Sheriff Dart can 
denounce Backpage to his heart’s content. He is in good company; many 
people are disturbed or revolted by the kind of sex ads found on 
Backpage’s website. And even in his official capacity the sheriff can 
express his distaste for Backpage and its look-alikes; that is, he can 
exercise what is called ‘[freedom of] government speech.’ A 
government entity, including therefore the Cook County Sheriff’s 
Office, is entitled to say what it wants to say—but only within limits. It 
is not permitted to employ threats to squelch the free speech of private 
citizens. ‘[A] government’s ability to express itself is [not] without 
restriction. . . . [T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the 
government’s speech.’30 
The government’s speech sometimes violates constitutional 
provisions other than the Free Speech Clause. For example, in Anderson 
v. Martin, the Supreme Court enjoined (what we now understand as)
governmental speech that invited and facilitated private discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. There the plaintiffs filed a 
section 1983 action to enjoin Louisiana’s state law that required the 
28. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 588 (D.D.C. 1986) (quoting the
Commission’s letters as stating that the Commission had “received testimony alleging that your 
company is involved in the sale or distribution of pornography. The Commission has determined that 
it would be appropriate to allow your company an opportunity to respond to the allegations prior to 
drafting its final report section on identified distributors.”). 
29. Id. at 587-88. 
30. Backpage.com v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 234-35 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
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government to state each candidate’s race on all ballots,31 and the 
Supreme Court agreed that the government’s statement impermissibly 
“encourage[d] its voters to discriminate on the grounds of race” in 
violation of equal protection.32 Other instances of government speech that 
invite or facilitate private discrimination against protected class 
members—as well as that which deters protected class members from 
exercising certain rights or seeking certain opportunities—may similarly 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.33 Examples could include challenges 
to state or local jurisdictions that require that public schools’ sex 
education curriculum include “[a]n emphasis, in a factual manner and 
from a public health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle 
acceptable to the general public.”34 
In thinking through these issues, we can also draw from the 
Establishment Clause context, in which courts often assess whether the 
government’s expressive choices—e.g., to engage in prayer or to display 
certain religious symbols—unconstitutionally “establish” religion even if 
they inflict only relatively diffuse or intangible injuries.35 Elsewhere I’ve 
31. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 30 (2017) (describing section 1983 as “the 
broadest federal civil rights statute and among the most consequential. It provides a private cause of 
action against any person who, ‘under color’ of state law, causes the deprivation of rights secured by 
the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States. . . . The statute can only be enforced by private 
lawsuits; it contains no government right to sue of other public enforcement provisions.”). Attorney’s 
fees also may be available for prevailing plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
32. 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964); see also id. (“But by placing a racial label on a candidate at the 
most crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the State furnishes a 
vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group because of race 
and for another. This is true because by directing the citizen’s attention to the single consideration of 
race or color, the State indicates that a candidate’s race or color is an important—perhaps 
paramount—consideration in the citizen’s choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast 
his ballot along racial lines. Hence in a State or voting district where Negroes predominate, that race 
is likely to be favored by a racial designation on the ballot, while in those communities where other 
races are in the majority, they may be preferred. The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the 
placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the 
polls.”).  
33. See Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194-208. 
34. See ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (1975); see also Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum
Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (2017) (describing a variety of state laws regulating public school 
teaching and curricula). 
35. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause
Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2010) (“[A] large proportion of all 
establishment clause jurisprudence could be thought of as involving claims about government 
religious speech, with the other broad category related to government aid.”). Lower courts have 
recognized at least two circumstances under which the government’s religious speech may inflict 
sufficiently concrete and particularized injuries upon listeners to satisfy the requirements of standing 
and empower the federal courts to consider the Establishment Clause claim. See David Spencer, 
What’s the Harm? NonTaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
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made merits arguments that draw from that tradition: just as courts 
sometimes find that the government’s religious speech is sufficiently 
coercive of listeners’ religious belief or practice to violate the 
Establishment Clause, so too might government’s hateful speech directed 
at protected class members sometimes be sufficiently coercive to violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.36 Here, I focus on remedies. And here too we 
can find plenty of examples of plaintiffs’ successful claims under 42 
U.S.C. section 1983 for injunctive and declaratory relief from state and 
local governments’ religious speech that violates the Establishment 
Clause. Some of these decisions involve challenges to the government’s 
religious speech that takes the form of prayer;37 others involve challenges 
to the government’s display of the Ten Commandments in certain public 
places or of religious symbols in holiday settings;38 others involve 
challenges to city or county seals or license plates that feature crosses or 
other religious symbols.39 
POL’Y 1071, 1075 (2011) (“The dominant approach requires a plaintiff to show some version of direct 
and unwelcome contact with the challenged symbol or display. A second approach requires a plaintiff 
to show that he altered his behavior to avoid contact with the allegedly offensive display.”). In the 
equal protection contest, for example, most potential plaintiffs could show direct and unwelcome 
contact with the government’s hateful or threatening message, and some could also show that the 
government’s message altered their behavior. Note that this sort of injury-in-fact standing as it arises 
in the Establishment Clause context is very different from taxpayer standing, in which a taxpayer 
challenges specific congressional appropriations alleged to establish religion in violation of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 58, 592-93, 610-
11 (2007) (holding that taxpayer standing is limited to challenges to Congress’s assertion of its power 
under the taxing and spending clauses and thus not available to challenge executive branch 
expenditures).  
36. Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194-98. 
37. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (ruling in favor of plaintiff
who brought Establishment Clause challenge to public high school’s prayer at football games and 
who sought injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 
(1992) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to public high 
school’s prayer at graduation ceremony and who sought a permanent injunction under section 1983); 
Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir 2011) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought 
Establishment Clause challenge to county board’s sponsorship of certain sectarian prayers and who 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983). 
38. E.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who
brought Establishment Clause challenge against county’s posting of Ten Commandments at its 
courthouses and who sought injunctive relief under section 1983); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
US 573 (1989) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to county’s 
inclusion of a crèche in a holiday display and who sought injunctive relief under section 1983).  
39. E.g., Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling in favor of plaintiff 
who brought Establishment Clause challenge to city seal that depicted a cross and who sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages and attorney’s fees under section 1983); 
Summers v. Adams, 669 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.S.C. 2009) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought 
Establishment Clause challenge to state’s license plate depicting a cross and the statement “I Believe” 
and who sought declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983).  
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In short, courts enjoined the government’s unconstitutional speech 
long before the Court had developed a vocabulary—much less a 
doctrine—for addressing government speech. And courts are not 
necessarily limited to traditional forms of injunctive relief that simply 
require the government to stop or remove its constitutionally harmful 
speech: as Tracy Thomas explains more generally, courts can also issue 
prophylactic injunctions to require training, monitoring, and other actions 
as necessary to ensure the government’s compliance with the Constitution 
and prevent future violations.40 Additional possibilities might include 
requiring the government to apologize or offer possibilities for corrective 
counterspeech.41 
III. CALL IT OUT: DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES
To be sure, injunctive relief may well be unavailable in cases where 
the government is unlikely to repeat or continue its expressive choices that 
have infringed upon its targets’ constitutional rights.42 This Part III thus 
explores other remedies for naming and deterring the constitutional 
injuries sometimes inflicted by the government’s speech. 
A. Declaratory Relief 
Declaratory relief is generally available to “call out” governmental 
speech that violates specific constitutional protections even absent a 
40. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004); see also id. at 380 
(“Prophylactic relief counters the lack of compliance with an adjudicated right and its instrumental 
remedy by (1) avoiding the defendants’ resistance to the right by mandating specific change, (2) 
providing clear notice to the defendants of expected behavior, and (3) ensuring the practical 
enforcement of the order by the court.”); see also Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory 
Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1125 (2014) (“Injunctions come in many varieties. They can prevent 
future violations or repair past ones. They can take the form of a simple flat prohibition; a positive 
command; a long statute-like array of prohibitions and commands; or a court’s effective takeover of 
operational control of an institution, such as a prison, school, or hospital”).  
41. For an example of the government’s voluntary apology for its speech (i.e., not the result of 
an injunction), the Office of the Solicitor General apologized in 2011 for its false representations in 
its litigation defending the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. See Neal 
Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American 
Internment Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES (May 20, 2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-
japanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/884T-HP2E]. 
42. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff did not
have standing to seek an injunction against the police department’s allegedly unconstitutional use of 
chokeholds when the plaintiff could not show that he would likely again suffer from such a 
chokehold). 
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viable claim for damages or injunctive relief.43 Moreover, declaratory 
relief’s primarily expressive character may be seen as more respectful of 
other governmental branches than more coercive forms of judicial relief.44 
Indeed, we can understand declaratory relief itself as a form of “soft law” 
that nevertheless performs important expressive and deterrent (i.e., 
naming and shaming) functions.45 At the same time, declaratory relief 
leaves open the possibility of further “hard law” relief that may take the 
form of injunctions or damages.46 
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court 
of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall 
be reviewable as such.”). For examples of successful claims for declaratory relief for the 
government’s unconstitutional speech, see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) 
(ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to public high school’s 
prayer at football games and who sought injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983); 
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief against state agency’s threatening speech that violated free speech protections); 
Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir 2011) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought 
Establishment Clause challenge to county board’s sponsorship of certain sectarian prayers and who 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief under section 1983); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 
1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to city 
seal that depicted a cross and who sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages 
and attorney’s fees under section 1983); Summers v. Adams, 669 F. Supp. 2d 637 (D.S.C. 2009) 
(ruling in favor of plaintiff who brought Establishment Clause challenge to state’s license plate 
depicting a cross and the statement “I Believe” and who sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 
section 1983); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 
(1951) (discussing availability of declaratory relief with respect to the government’s potentially 
unlawful speech). 
44. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974) (“Congress plainly intended declaratory 
relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction . . . .”); see also Bray, supra note 
40, at 1093-94 (2014) (explaining that, unlike injunctive relief, declaratory relief includes neither a 
command to the defendant nor a sanction for noncompliance). 
45. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Even where 
a declaration of unconstitutionality is not reviewed by this Court, the declaration may still be able to 
cut down the deterrent effect of an unconstitutional state statute. The persuasive force of the court’s 
opinion and judgment may lead state prosecutors, courts, and legislators to reconsider their respective 
responsibilities toward the statute. Enforcement policies or judicial construction may be changed, or 
the legislature may repeal the statute and start anew.”); Bray, supra note 40, at 1121 (“[O]nce we put 
aside the simplistic notion that word is less powerful than deed, it no longer makes sense to say that 
the declaratory judgment is a milder remedy because it merely declares.”); id. at 1124 (“The central 
difference between the declaratory judgment and the injunction in contemporary American law is 
management, in the sense of continuing judicial direction and oversight of the parties. The injunction 
enables a high degree of management. The declaratory judgment does not. As a result, the decision 
to grant one or the other of these remedies should chiefly be a decision about the degree of direction 
and oversight that the relationship of the parties requires of the court.”). 
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2202 (“Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment
or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights 
have been determined by such judgment.”); see also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. 
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B. Damages 
Sometimes the government’s speech inflicts damage of the sort that 
the law has traditionally treated as relatively quantifiable.47 Examples 
include the government’s lies that lead to wrongful arrest or 
imprisonment48 or the government’s threatening speech that leads to its 
target’s job loss. For example, the Sixth Circuit refused to dismiss a 
section 1983 claim for damages by a plaintiff who alleged that the 
government had retaliated against her constitutionally protected speech 
with false and coercive speech of its own that led to her firing.49 More 
specifically, after the plaintiff had expressed opposition to the county’s 
proposed highway project at a public meeting, a county official called her 
employer, falsely stated that the plaintiff had identified her employer in 
opposing the project, and asked whether the employer was truly 
committed to local development.50 The employer fired the plaintiff shortly 
thereafter, allegedly because the county’s false claim led it to believe that 
she had used the employer’s name in opposing the development project.51 
In declining to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for damages, the court 
concluded that the governmental expression at issue would violate free 
Co., Ltd., 41 F.3d 764, 773-74 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Section 2202 . . . authoriz[es] a district court to grant 
additional relief consistent with the underlying declaration even though the right to the relief may 
arise long after the court has entered its declaratory judgment.”). 
47. To be sure, the government is sometimes immunized from damages liability. For example, 
the Court has held that governmental actors enjoy absolute immunity from money damages when they 
have been found to have violated the law when engaged in certain essential governmental functions. 
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988) (discussing absolute immunity for judges 
performing certain judicial actions); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that the 
President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts). Government actors 
found to have violated the Constitution when engaged in functions that do not trigger absolute 
immunity may nevertheless enjoy “qualified immunity” from money damages so long as they did not 
violate law that was clearly established at the time and of which a reasonable person would have been 
aware. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held 
that state and local government actors’ defamatory speech does not trigger procedural due process 
protections under section 1983 unless it causes job loss or some other economic injury in addition to 
a stigmatic injury. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Governmental immunities, however, are 
sometimes waived or limited. E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (declining to find 
that a prosecutor’s allegedly false statements made when announcing a defendant’s indictment fell 
within the zone of prosecutorial functions that are absolutely immune from damages liability). 
48. See, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (where the challenger brought 
a section 1983 lawsuit alleging that law enforcement officers’ lies about the content of substances 
seized from him led to his arrest and pretrial detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
49. Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 2010). 
50. Id. at 276. 
51. Id. at 277. 
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speech protections if intended, and reasonably likely, to retaliate against 
the plaintiff’s speech by encouraging her employer to fire her.52 
Even when the constitutional injuries inflicted by government speech 
can be difficult to quantify in monetary terms, nominal damages can serve 
both expressive and deterrent functions.53 This can be the case, for 
example, when the government’s speech silences its targets, or causes 
them to refrain from exercising a protected right or from seeking a certain 
opportunity. Indeed, in the section 1983 context the Court has emphasized 
the value of nominal damages more generally in cases where 
constitutional injuries are hard to quantify in monetary terms: 
By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal 
damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the 
importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously 
observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that 
substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury 
or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish 
malicious deprivations of rights.54 
The award of nominal damages can thus establish the unconstitutionality 
of the government’s actions—and, by putting government officials on 
notice of such action’s unconstitutionality, may eliminate the availability 
of qualified immunity from money damages in future cases. The award of 
nominal damages also materially alters the legal relationship of the 
parties, and thus sometimes permits the award of attorney’s fees to the 
plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.55 
James E. Pfander has made similar, and forceful, arguments in the 
context of Bivens claims56 for monetary damages for federal officials’ 
unconstitutional conduct in the war on terror: 
52. Id. at 281-83. 
53. Nominal damages, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, are a “trifling sum awarded when 
a legal injury is suffered but there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated” and serve as a 
declaration that the plaintiff’s legal rights have been violated. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 396 
(7th ed. 1999). In contrast, a declaratory judgment is “a binding adjudication that establishes the rights 
and other legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement.” Id. at 846. 
54. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 266, 1978; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 
477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) (holding that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for 
violations of constitutional rights where actual injury cannot be shown: “Our discussion of that issue 
makes clear that nominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable ‘value’ of infringed 
rights, are the appropriate means of ‘vindicating’ rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, 
provable injury.”). 
55. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121 (1992). 
56. Bivens claims are implied private rights of actions for compensatory and punitive damages 
for “a compensable injury to a legally protected interest by a deprivation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States at the hands of a federal official acting under color of 
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[T]he federal courts should focus on the narrow (but supremely 
important) task of evaluating the legality of official conduct. Once that 
understanding of the judicial role has been accepted, existing law 
furnishes ample tools with which to reach the merits of misconduct 
claims. First, rather than making case-by-case assessments of the 
viability of Bivens claims, the federal courts should presume the 
availability of such an action and focus their attention on the nature of 
the constitutional right at issue. Such an approach would mirror that of 
the federal courts in Section 1983 litigation against state officials, thus 
bringing into closer alignment the application of constitutional 
principles to both the state and federal levels of government. Second, 
the Court should rethink its qualified immunity jurisprudence to 
facilitate merits adjudication of legal claims. One way to accomplish 
such a return to the merits would be to allow litigants to limit themselves 
to a claim for nominal damages. Such nominal claims would enable the 
court to reach the constitutional issue in a world of legal uncertainty 
without confronting the officer with a threat of personal liability and 
triggering the qualified immunity defense. Public interest law firms and 
some plaintiffs might agree to take on the burden of litigating nominal 
claims to secure a measure of vindication and to better define the limits 
of what government can do in the name of national security. Both of 
these important changes can be made with no action by Congress; they 
both have a strong foundation in current law.57 
For similar reasons, nominal damages should be available to name and 
deter government expression that violates specific free speech, free press, 
due process, and equal protection guarantees—such as coercive or 
threatening government speech that silences its targets, or governmental 
lies that deprive their targets of the meaningful ability to exercise voting 
or reproductive rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION
As James Pfander worries more generally, our failure to identify and 
provide remedies for constitutional violations leads to a shortage of law 
about when the government violates the Constitution.58 I worry about that 
possibility specifically in the context of government speech; although 
governments from their inception have engaged in expression, only 
federal law. The only proper defendants are federal employees in their individual capacities, or private 
actors whose conduct is so related to the federal government that they can be deemed federal agents 
or actors.” HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 243 
(2001).  
57. JAMES PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR, xviii (2017). 
58. See id. 
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recently have we begun to consider the ways in which the government’s 
speech sometimes threatens constitutional rights. Again, my ambitions for 
this short essay are modest: to show that the government’s expressive 
choices that harm specific constitutional interests are amenable to 
constitutional remedies in some situations, and thus that the judiciary has 
some role to play in this area. In so doing, I hope to provide a platform for 
future thinking and problem-solving. 
